Hospitality Review
Volume 7
Issue 1 Hospitality Review Volume 7/Issue 1

Article 7

1-1-1989

Financial Failure In the Hospitality Industry
Edward M. Tavlin
Josephthal & Co

Elisa S. Moncarz
Florida International University, moncarze@fiu.edu

Deb Dumont
Florida International University, hospitality@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Corporate Finance
Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Food and Beverage Management
Commons
Recommended Citation
Tavlin, Edward M.; Moncarz, Elisa S.; and Dumont, Deb (1989) "Financial Failure In the Hospitality Industry," Hospitality Review: Vol.
7 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol7/iss1/7

This work is brought to you for free and open access by FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hospitality Review by an
authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Financial Failure In the Hospitality Industry
Abstract

The hospitality industry (especially the restaurant segment) has a historically high rate of financial failures.
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identify basic reasons underlying failed ideas while presenting a study of several hospitality chains that have
experienced varying degrees of financial failure. The characteristics and pitfalls of these companies provide the
necessary groundwork to explore major lessons to be learned which should aid hospitality management to
aviod future business failures.
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The hospitality industry (especially the restaurant segment) has a historically high rate of financial failures. Yet, financial failure in the industry has
not received the attention it deserves. In this article, the authors identify
basic reasons underlying failed ideas while presenting a study of several
hospitalitychains that have experiencedvarying degreesof financial failure.
The characteristics and pitfalls of these companies provide the necessary
groundwok to explore major lessons to be learned which should aid hospitality management to avoid future business failures.

Each year a significant number of hospitality firms close their
doors. Generally, food servidrestaurant companies experience a
higher rate of failure than do lodging companies. Unfortunately, the
statistics that are availablecan be somewhat misleading since they are
composed of only those businesses that have filed for bankruptcy. The
figures do not include businesses that have closed, but have been able
to pay off their debts. Nor do they include companies that have been
able to resolve their hancial di£Ficulties and continue in business.'
In 1986 the failure rate per 10,000listed concerns (Dun's Census
of American Business)for eating and drinking places was 142. During
the same period, the failure rate for the lodging industry was 65. In
1987 there was a slight decrease in the failure rate for both segments.
Eating and drinking places experienced a failure of 91per 10,000listed
concerns, while the failure rate for hotels was 62 per 10,000listed concerns.=
Failure is defined by Mbster as "the state of fact of being lacking
or insdicient (YBUing short')." Failure does not necessarily result in
the dissolution of a business. In an economic sense, failure means that
a firm'srevenues do not cover costs. At the other extreme, there is insolvency in bankruptcy when the company's net worth is negative (i.e.,
liabilities exceed the appraised value of company's assets). In between
there exists an entire range of possibilities which may be temporary
and subject to remedy, but if not corrected, could lead to the dissolution
of the business.
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Table 1 summarizes the three basic types of financial or business

fdm.
Table 1
Types of Financial Failures
Term

Definition

EconomicFailure

Occurs when a company's costs
exceed its revenuesor that the
internal rates or return on its
investments are less than its cost of
~apital.~

Technical Insolvency

Source

Arthur J. Keown
John D. Martin
Wfiam Petty
David E Scott
Basicfiancial
Management
Occurs when a business cannot pay A&ur J.Kmm, et al
its obligations.The book value of its B a s i c f i a n d
assets may exceed its liabilities,
Management
indicatingpositive net worth, but the
company does not have sufficient
Lawrence J.Gitrnan
liquidity to pay its debts. The
Principles of
business may be able to escape
total fail- if it can convert some &agerial Flnance
of its assets into cash within a
reasonable time.*J

Occurs when the company's
Arthur J. Keown, et al.
liabilitiesare actuallygreater than BasicHmmcial
the fair market valuation of its
Management
assets, indicatingnegativenet
worth. The firm is totally unable to
meet its maturing obligations.This
situation generallyindicates that
liquidation or dissolutionrather
than reorganizationof t h e h is
necessary?

Just as there are various degrees of failure, there are also a
number of remedies available to an organization in financial distress.
These solutions may be applied voluntarily or involuntarily. Most voluntary remedies are applied by the business without court or trustee
supervision of the settlement.
Table 2
Types of Voluntaryflnvoluntary Solutions To Financial Failures
Term

Definition

Source

Extension

A b ' s mditors agree to
postpone debt payments for a
specitiedtime period in order
to mitigate the firm's problems.'

CharlesW. Haley
Lawrence D. Schall
Introduction to
fiancial Management

Composition

A W s creditors agree to
receive less than the amount
originally owed to them.8

CharlesW. Haley
Lawrence D. Srhall
Intmdudion to
fiancial
Management
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Term

Definition

Quasi-reomation

Occurswhen a firmmodifies
its capitalstructure.This
m&cation usually involves
writing off a deficit against
additional paid-in capital;
duction in the par value of
the company's common stock, or
write-down of overvalued assets.
Aquasi-reorganizationpermits
a companyto regainita poeition
as a pmfitable business without
the stigma associated with large
deficits or continuous operating
lessee?

Source

E. John Larsen

k M. Mosich
Intermediate
Accounting

Chapter 11
~ankruptcyReform
Act of 1978

This remedy is applied under
court supervision. Usually
the debtor remains in possession
of and continuesto operate the
firm while working out a plan
to settle the company's obligations. Chapter 11permits these
negotiationsto be conducted
directlyamongthe debtor,
&torn and etodrholders.1°

Glenn G. Munn
Encplopedia
ofBankmgand
fiance

Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978

This is an involuntary solution.
It is applied in situations
where it has been determined
that a fair, equitable, and
feasiblebasis for reorganization does not exist.The
business is liquidated or dissolved in an orderly manner.
Any proceeds h m the sale of
the asseta are distributedto
creditorsfirst. Any residual
proceeds are then distributed
to the shareh~lders.".~

Lamnce J. Gitman
Principlesof
Managerial
liInance
John D. FInnerty
corporate
fiancial
Analysis

There are many reasons leading to business failures, particularly
restaurant failures. Studies show that only 10 percent of all failures
are directly attributable to acts of God, neglect, or dishonesty on the
part of management or owners. Some reasons for failure include poor
execution, ego of the founder, undercapitalization, non-diversification,
abandonment of a successful concept, inadequate manager andlor employee training,poor upkeep of the property, too rapid expansion, inadequate internal controls, reliance on a gimmick theme, poor site
selection, and inadequate market analysis.
W will now examine several different companies that have experienced varying degrees of financial failure.
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Wendy's International, Inc.
Wendy's was recently rated number five in the Nation'sRestaurant
News Top 100 Chains ranked by system-wide sales. Annual systemwide sales as of August 1988 were $3 billion. Rndy's was also ranked
number five in this survey in the market share category. In the hamburger chain segment, Wendy's is currently ranked fourth in systemwide sales, third in number of units with 3,950, and eleventh in sales
per unit.'3
Kndy's concept is based on freshly-ground ("hot off the grill")
hamburgers garnished with the customers' choice of toppings. Although it has been considered adult oriented, the company has increased its efforts to attract the "family" market.
In the past Kndy's was considered one of the best chain operators.
Management would thoroughly study an idea before implementing it.
Initially, things were kept simple. In order to keep capital costs down,
Mkndy's built smaller units and purposely planned to do most of its
business through the drive-thru window. The company also made a
conscious decision not to complicate the menu with a large variety of
items. Hamburgers, fixed a number of ways, were the key to success.
Additionally, during the early years, Wendy's was able to get greater
productivity out of store crews than either McDonald's or Burger King.
As a result of these basic philosophies, Wendy's was considered a success from the opening of its first store in 1969through the end of 1984.
However, in 1985, deviation from the basic concept and some basic business practices began to negatively affect the company's performance
for the first time in 15 years.
In 1983,the company had a net income of $55.2 million. The profit
margin was 8 percent and Return on Equity (ROE)was 19percent. Revenues increased to $720 million, up 19percent and system-wide sales
increased to $1.92 billion, up 18 percent. The company attributed its
inc~ased
profitability to the opening of 95 additional (both foreign and
domestic) company-owned units, increased real sales volume, and, to
a lesser degree, increased prices. Several new menu items such as the
bacon cheesebwger, an upgraded salad bar, and a "hot stuffed " baked
potato helped stimulate sales. Additionally, the cost of sales decreased
during the year as a result of increased operating efficiencies, lower
beef prices, and a change in the product mix.
In 1984, net income increased to $68.7 million. The profit margin
remained steady at 8 percent, but ROE increased slightly to 20 percent. Revenues increased to $944.7 million, up 31 percent, and systemwide sales increased to $2.42 billion, up 26 percent. Again, the company attributed its success to the opening of additional companyowned units14,increased real sales volume, and an increase in prices.
The unusual success of its 'Where's the Beef?" TV commercials was
also very important. The company introduced a new daypart (breakfast) and extended its hours of operation to include late night service.
Breakfast was becoming the fastest growing daypart in the fast food
segment at this time. The company also implemented computerized
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cash registers which improved operating efficiency and cash controls.
Management personnel and crew depth were also increased.
Several Factors Contributed To Financial Failure
In 1985, Rndy's net income was $76.1 million and the highest
level of earnings achieved in the company's 16-year history. &venues
were up to $1.126 billion, an increase of 19 percent, and system-wide
sales increased to $2.69 billion, up 11 percent. During this year
Vkndy's opened 200 additional company-operated units. The profit
margin and ROE both decreased slightly to 7 percent and 19 percent,
respectively. This slight decline was attributed to the softness in the
economy and lower discretionary spending by consumers. In addition,
the breakfast program generated less than anticipated sales. Breakfast menu items were not finger foods, easily served and eaten on the
go. Costs associated with the program (advertising, labor, etc.) also increased as a result of increased its use of couponing during this period
to protect its market share and remain competitive. Coupon expenses
increased to 1.7 percent of sales compared to .7 percent in 1984. Additionally, Wendy's introduced a 'light" menu in response to the growing
popularity of low-calorie and healthy foods.
In 1986, Wendy's sustained a net loss of $4.9 million, the first in
the company's history. The profit margin was less than 1percent and
ROE was negative. Revenues increased by 1percent, totaling $1.14 billion. System-wide sales increased to $2.7 billion, up 2 percent. Management continued to blame softness in the restaurant industry for the
poor results. The company also blamed increased competition for the
erosion of sales related to some products and dayparts. In addition,
Wendy's increased couponing in response to competition. Coupon expense increased to 2.6 percent of sales in 1986, as compared to 1.7 percent in 1985. Wendy's also took a $51.8 million restaurant realignment
charge (this include write-down of assets and estimated losses until
the units were disposed of) for the disposition of 164marginal or unprofitable company operated units. These units were to be franchised or
closed. The company also repurchased 744,000 shares of its stock for
$9.9 million. During 1986, the company introduced Wendy's Big
Classic which was designed to refocus attention on its primary product, the hamburger. Baked potatoes, breakfast, and salad bars had
clouded its h d a m e n t a l product.
In 1987,Wendy's earned a profit of $4.5 million. The profit margin
remained a t less than 1percent, but ROE increased slightly to 1percent. Retail sales declined slightly during this year to $987.7 million,
down from $1.036 billion in 1986, due to lower sales per unit. In addition, Wendy's introduced the "SuperBar" concept, an "all you can eat"
hot and cold food bar featuring salad items, Mexican food items, and
Italian pasta items. Food costs also increased as a result of this program. Additionally, implementation of the SuperBar requires a $25
thousand per unit capital investment. Couponing also increased for
the third straight year, costing the company 3.2 percent of sales in
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1987, as compared to 2.6 percent in 1986. Wendy's implemented subprogram.
stantially all of its re-ent
One of the primary reasons for this companys financial problems
was deviation from the companfs basic concept, freshly-ground burgers. Wendy's attempted to increase its market share by broadening
the menu; in doing so, they began to lose touch with a successful formula. In most surveys the consumer generally rates Wndy's hamburgers better than the competition.
Another reason for the company's distress was its breakfast concept. In mid-1985Wendy's tried to takeadvantage of the growingb d fast market by introducing a "cooked-border"breakfast menu. However, the company was misguided in its attempt. The menu that was
developed was not fhger food; it couldn't be eaten in the car or at the
desk. Instead, the customer was forced to sit down in the restaurant
and eat his meal with a fork and knife. The menu was also considered
very expensive, labor intensive, and operationally slow.
The heavy use of couponing or discounting also a f f k t d Wndy's
financial performance. Beginnjng in 1985, the company increased its
reliance on coupons and discounts to stimulate sales, protect its market share, and respond to the use of coupons by cornpetitow,
McDonald's and Burger I b g . However, discounting did not stimulate
sales to any measurable degree. Couponing rarely provides more than
a short-term boost to revenues.
In spite of a declining hancial position and a poor operating performance, Wndy's used funds of $22.9 million in 1987 and $19.9 million in 1986 for the payment of dividends. As a result of dividend payments and stock repurchases, Kndy's financial position weakened
further.
Turnaround Strategiesrn
IWndy's f d s into the category of an economic failure,that is, failure to continue its great success.
Wndy's has implemented several strategies to turn its financial
situation mund, including returning to an emphasis on its primary
product, the hamburger, with the introduction of wndy's Big Classic.
In addition, the company is currently testing smaller (2 02.) and lowpriced hamburgers and cheeseburgers in some markets. Its "Hamburger
television commercials are helping refattention on
Wndy's hamburgers.
In the firstquarter of fiscal 1986,h d y ' s decided to make breakfast an optional menu item. Most of the domestic company and franchise stores discontinued the program. Although Wndy's management
indicated in its 1986Annual Report that it was working on a number
of b m a k f " variations, the immediate emphasis was on the hamburge~.
%ndy's has also s l d the gmwth of its companyamed units
which resulted in reduced capital spending. Rather than opening a
large (100+ ) number of restaurants each year, the company plans to
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continue its emphasis on improving operations in existing units,and
on completion of image enhancement programs, and also plans to reduce its ownership of stores. In the past, Wendy's maintained ownership of 36 percent of total units. Large scale development and international development will be handled primarily through franchising.
Another turnaround strategy implemented by the company was
a reorganization a t the corporate level eliminating over 400 positions
in 1987. Several layers of management between the top levels and field
operations were eliminated as well as other administrative programs
that did not effectively support restaurant operations. The franchise
area director's staff was increased to provide more one-on-one assistance to franchisees. Critical to future success, the franchise system is
in disarray. Many failed and others are well behind in license payments. Decision-makinghas been decentralized somewhat and restaurant managers are being held more directly accountable for running
their units. These changes should result in a reduction in Wendy's administrative and general expenses.
The SuperBar, another turnaround strategy, is designed to set the
company apart from direct competition with McDonald's and Burger
Kmg. According to Wendy's officials, the SuperBar has broadened its
customer base by attracting new customers, more families, and more
dinner and weekend business. Recently, Wendy's announced plans to
test the viability of adding Chinese food and pizza to the SuperBar to
. ~ SuperBar is a high risk stratkeep customer interest s t i m ~ l a t e dThe
egy, due to capital costs, but a needed gamble.
The turnaround strategies have begun to take hold and have resulted in a steady improvement in overall performance. For the second
quarter of fiscal 1988, profits increased to $9.6 million, nearly five
times the profits for the same period in 1987.16
Wendy's Has Earnings Rebound
In the September 12,1988,issue of Nation's Restaurant News, several financial analysts indicated they believe Wendy's is once again on
its way to being a viable and successful company. According to Caroline
Levy of Shearson Lehman Hutton, who changed her rating of Wendy's
stock from "sell" to "accumulate," "the stock represents good value
based on its potential earnings momentum."17 Her view reflects her
confidence in the turnaround strategies implemented by Wendy's,
which are supported by improving profit margins, finances, and some
store sales. At company store levels operating margins have improved
by 5 percent over the previous year due to better operational controls,
a sigrdicant reduction in couponing, and lower food costs.
Accorcimg to Becky Barfield of First Boston in New York, "the
strong earnings rebound represents some recovery of sales and s i d icant operating improvements. It appears that Wendy's earnings outlook is improving.18
Despite these positive opinions, some analysts remain cautious
about the company's turnaround. There is concern that the SuperBars
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am cannibdizhg core menu sales since same store sales and real sales
haw only sustained moderate inmases since their introduction.Some
analysts estimate that the sale of non-SuperBar menu items has actually deweased by 20 pemnt since the introduction of this new item.
h d n g to Jay Freedman of Kidder, Peabody and Co., there are
two major obstacles in the way of a complete recovery by Wndy's.
"Fht, the company's SuperBar remains u n p m n ...the companymust
find ways to keep customers interested once the novelty wears
The second obstacle pertains to Wndy's franchisesystem, which Freedman saya remains weak,18 percent of franchise royalties are still in
anears.
Most analysta are taking a "wait and seenattitude on Wndy's bemuse,although the companyis beginning to see some tangible results,
progress is not yet strong enough to warrant a strong or attractive stock
rating.20Mndy'sstock is only nominally above its 1988low for the year.

Victoria Station
Victoria Station is the next example of a restaurant company that
has experienced financial problems. However, this company's financial
difliculties were much more serious than the previous example.
Victoria Station was conceived as a medium-priced,limited menu
(initially only six entrees were offered) restaurant featuring prime rib
served in old railroad boxcars which functioned as the dining rooms.
This theme, boxcars and old railroad memorabilia, was used for all the
company's restaurants. The concept was designed to appeal to singles,
couples, and families who were looking for good quality food at reasonable prices.21
The company opened its f h t restaurant in San Francisco, California, in April 1969. By the end of 1978,Victoria Station had 97 restaurants in operation. These restaurants were all company-owned since
there were no franchises. In 1986, as a result of its various financial
problems, Victoria Station had 39 restaurants in operation.
During its first decade the company was very successful.However,
in 1980 the kancial picture began to change.
Financial Failure Sets In
In both 1980 and 1981,Victoria Station suffered operating losses.
However, in 1982 the company was able to achieve a small profit due
to halted expansion, reorganization of management, and tightening
cost controls. The profit margin was 1percent and the return on equity
was 3percent. This proved to be the last profitable year for Victoria Stati~n.~~
In 1983, the company suffered a loss of $8 million. Both the profit
margin and mturn on equity were negative. Sales declined from 1982
by $11.6 million, resulting primarily from a decline in customer counts.
Poor economic conditions were also blamed as well as an increase in
expenses as Victoria Station attempted to reposition itselfz3It is interesting to note that all our failure examples cite poor economic condi-
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tions for the onset of their problems. Yet, in all cases there were success-

ful competitors in those same markets.
In 1984, mctoria Station's loss was $5.76 million. Again, both the
profit margin and return on equity were negative. Sales also declined,
but not at the same rate as the previous year.They decreased by $7.5
million.24
In 1985,the company's loss was $5.25 million, and sales decreased
by $8.4 million.26
In 1986, the worst year experienced by Victoria Station, the loss
was $35.42 million and sales decreased by $19 million from the previous year. While there were other contributingfactors, most of the losses
over this five-year period were attributed to the sale of restaurants and
a drop in customer counts. Losses in 1985 and 1986 were also attributed to the failure of "Bonkers," a gourmet hamburger restaurant.
Victoria Station allocated funds from its dinner house market to
develop this new concept and penetrate a new market segment.26
One of the major reasons for this company's failure was too rapid
growth.Vidoria Station's unit expansion was undercapitalized as well.
The company, like so many others, felt the pressure from Wall Street
to keep growing and increasing earnings. Many of the sale and lease
back arrangements the company entered into in order to finance its
growth were more costly than its original investment in the properties.
Another aspect affecting the companfs growth was the fad that it did
not fmchise, thus it was highly leveraged and assumed all the risk
should things go wrong.27
Another major reason for the company's decline was the theme itself. Customers became bored with eating in a boxcar. Rather than
being enjoyable or entertaining, the concept became tedious. Additionally, this theme or motif could not be adapted for other uses. There was
nothing the company could do to it that would modify it to any degree.
The boxcars were also expensive to buy, renovate, or maintain. Many
of them had leaky roofs and lacked proper insulation, and to renovate
one cost more than the renovation of an ordinary building.28
Closely related to its inflexible theme was the fact that
Station relied heavily on a single item-beef. Rising beef prices as well
as a decrease in beef consumption by consumers contributed to the
company's poor financial performance. While it tried to adapt to this
change in consumer tastes, it made so many changes that Victoria Station lost its identity and unique positioning with the consumer.
In addition, there was no economy of scale with the way the restaurants were established. There were never more than five to six restaurants in any given market, thus supervisory costs and advertising expenses were very high.
One other major contributing factor to the company's distress was
its attempt to expand into the gourmet burger market. In 1984, the
company opened its first Bonkers Burger Bar & Grill. It quickly grossed $2.6 million in sales. Soon after, Victoria Station opened five additional units. This concept failed rather quickly, however, because of the
amount of competition in this very narrow market segment.29
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Victoria Station Files for Bankruptcy
Victoria Station falls on the scale as a total failure; in May 1986,
the company filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The reorganization plan called for a reduction in the number of restaurants to 45 Victoria Station units and two Bonkers resta~rants.~"
Prior to filing for protection under Chapter 11, the company tried
to implement a number of turnaround strategies.
In 1981, Terrance Collins, replacing Richard Bardley (one of the
original founders) as the company's CEO, halted the company's expansion, reorganized management, tightened cost controls, and made several menu and price changes. He was able to cut administrative expenses by 30 percent and reduced food costs to below 40 percent.31Collins left Vidoria Station in 1982following a dispute with the board over
the company's future. He was replaced by Richard N i g l i ~ . ~ ~
Under Niglio's guidance, Vidoria Station attempted to reposition
itself by updating and expanding its menu. New items included seafood, poultry, and pasta entrees, as well as appetizers and an expanded
salad bar. He also directed changes in the restaurant decor and irnproved facility maintenance. Also during this period, the company
began disposing of unprofitable restaurants.
In addition, Niglio was responsible for trying to increase the company's market share with the Bonkers concept. In 1984, the gourmet
buzger segment was considered by many to have real growth potential,
while growth of the dinner house segment had begun to slow down.
Some expenses were also restructured in 1984,1985, and 1986, including a write-down of assets held for sale, reclassificationof current
maturities to long term debt, reclassificationa short term liabilities as
pre-petition liabilities, and a reduction in notes recei~ables.~~
The company also exchanged some of both its common and preferred stmk for a reduction in its long term debt and interest expense.
Stock was also used to secure a $5 million loan in 1984.Victoria Station
discontinued dividend payments in 1981to conform to the terms of one
of its loan agreements.
In spite of these attempts at a turnaround, the company was unable to reverse its failure.
Current Situation
In December 1987, Lowell Farkas formed the
Station Acquisition Corporation (VSAC), which purchased the Victoria Station
trademark, 11restaurants located in Boston, Miami, and New York for
$6.5 million, and assumed a $1 million tax liability. The purchase agreement also required VSAC to turn over 10 percent of its stock to
shareholders of the old Victoria Station stock. Additionally, another 10
percent of the common stock plus 1million shares of preferred stock
were to go to unsecured creditors of the old Victoria Station.34
As of August 1988,VSAC was still privately held and no information about the company going public was available. However, Farkas is
confident he can lead Victoria Station to a comeback.
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Sambo's
Of all the companies reviewed here, Sambo's is considered the
classic example of a successfulcompany "gone bad." The company went
from an organization of 1,117 restaurants in 1981 to a final sell-off of
175 units (&r filing for Chapter 11protection) in 1985.
Sambo's opened its first restaurant in 1957with a concept of a lowpriced pancakelcoffee house. The target market was primarily blue-collar families and the concept was designed to be a mass appeal, valueoriented restaurant.35
By 1963 the company had grown to 20 units which served approximately five million customers annually. During the six-year period
Sambo's sigmficantly outperformed its competition. No menu prices
were raised; the average check was $1.25, and prices were 15 percent
below competitors. Simultaneously, Sambo's achieved a net profit-tosales ratio of 18percent. This success was attributed to high customer
volume and fast customer turnover.36
By 1969 the company had 92 restaurants in operation, serving
100,000 customers daily. In addition, the company went public. "The
act of going public changed Sambo's entire complexion, putting it in
the limelight and encouraging acerbated expansion."37On its first day
of trading, the company's stock went from $19/share to $32/share.
Sambo's became the "darling" of Wall Street during the mid-1970s.
By 1977the company had 869 restaurants in operation and profits
had increased to $22.8 million.38
The primary reason for Sambo's successful expansion during this
period was a company profit sharing plan called "Fraction of the Action" (FDA). Under this plan a restaurant manager could purchase 20
percent ownership of his particular restaurant and in return for his investment could receive up to 20 percent of the restaurant's profits. This
program served to instill an "entrepreneurial spirit" into the ranks of
unit management. The program worked because the management
team was interested and motivated to insure that quality and other
operational controls were properly managed. Additionally, the FDA
program helped provide capital to finance the company's aggressive expansi~n.~~
In 1976, however, initial warning signs began to appear that signaled future problems. One such signal was slower or flattening
growth in unit sales, which increased by only 7 percent. This situation
was further aggravated by the growing corporate bureaucracy. According to one s o w , "There were all sorts of management people giving
and taking directions. As the corporation kept growing, they paid less
and less attention to the restaurant^."^^
Downfall Began in 1
9n
The company's ultimate downfall began in 1977. During that year
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ruled that the FDA
program was a security and had to be registered with the SEC. Additionally, the receipts from these investments could not be counted as
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revenues, but had to be recorded on the balance sheet as a deposit
(Samba's had the option to buy back the managers' investment when
they left the company.) The SEC gave the company two options if it
wanted to retain the program.
Restate all revenues and earnings for the elght-par period since
Sambo's had gone public by converting the FllA purchases from
revenues to deposits.
Immediately vest all the participating managers, giving them
permanent title to their 20 percent ownership.41
"Sambo's chose the latter alternative. It amended the program to
offer only 1percent interest for $3,000to new managers each year and
tried to induce current managers to sell back their vested shares by offering as much as $50,000 to buy back the 20 percent $20,000 shares
on which the managers had been making 20 percent of the annualpretax profits of their units."42
On August 23, 1977, the company's board decided to abolish the
program, giving two reaso11~,for the decision. F'irst, with expansion
going at such a rapid pace, the board felt the program might become
uncontrollable. Second,if Sambo's wanted to position itselfto be purchased by another restaurant company, the FDA program would block
the sale.'"
The managers considered this move a betrayal of their trust,and
few believed that the SEC had actually forced the change. Managers
began leaving the company in droves. Within six months of abolishing
the program, 50 percent of the managers had quit. Beginning in 1978
average management turnover exceeded 100percent. 'l'he incentives,
stability, and cohesiveness that had been built were destroyed."44The
entrepeneurial manager was gone and unit controls were virtually
nonexistent.
"InApril 1986 a $7 million settlement was reached in a class action suit by Sambo's former shareholders for compensatory damages
for alleged stock market losses following the August 23,1977, modification of the Fraction of the Action Plan."*
A second reason for the company's severe h c i a l distress was
that despite the fact the FIlA program had been abolished and was considered the basis for the company's expansion, top management
pushed an even more aggressive rat.of expansion. Beginning in 1977,
Sambo7sexpanded at a rate of well over 100 units per year.& Such expansion was beyond the capacityof its thin real estate and construction

staff.
Another major drain on the company's finances was the number
of lawsuits in which it found itself involved. In 1979,former managers
of the company began fihg suit against Sambo's claiming that the
FDA program was a pyramid scheme that took the investment of the
individual restaurant managers and put it in the pockets of top corporate management. The company was also hit with lawsuits fmm the
NAACP and other civil rights groups which charged discrimination be-
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cause of the negative connotation of the company's name which they
felt was derived from the children's story Little Black Samb~."~
As a result of the high management turnover, there was no continuity left in the company and no organization at the field level to
maintain proper controls. Additionally, there was also a lack of proper
internal controls a t the individual unit level, one of which was poor
money handling.Additionally, cleanliness and sanitation standards of
the facilities began to seriously deteriorate.
Company Files for Bankruptcy in 1985
Sambo's is also considered a complete or total failure. In 1985the
company filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11;however, it did try to
implement some corrective actions.
In 1979,Daniel Shaughnessy became the CEO for Sambo's. Under
his direction the company implemented the "Price Point" strategy
which reduced the company's overhead a t the corporate, field, and restaurant levels. From 1979 to 1981Sambo's reduced its employees fmm
37,000 to 28,000.48
Another change implemented under the "Price Pointnstrategy included elimination of the Senior Citizens Discount program, affecting
the company's image with senior customers and senior stockholders.
Sambo's also raised menu prices and implemented a menu pricing
strategy based on several different meal combinations. However, both
customers and restaurant st& were confused as to how this program
actually worked. Meanwhile, the physical appearance of the restaurants continued to deteriorate."'
Despite these and several other efforts, Sambo's was unable to recover from its financial distress, and in 1985filed for complete liquidation of its assets.

Jerrico, Inc.
Jerrico's h n g John Silver's Seafood Shoppes "had grabbed 50 percent of the s e a f i i market by 1982 while experiencing a rise in earnings from $1.1 million to $20.9 million fmm 1972 to 1982, making it
the 14th fastest growing U.S. corporation for that period."50It also became "the eighth largest fast-food chain in the ~ountry."~~But
Long
John Silver's reliance on codfish imported from Iceland and Canada
resulted in less control over the price and size of the catch compared
to smoother price changes in the burger market. Because the price of
fish has risen so sharply,the company has been forced to raise its prices
sigdicantly or serve smaller portions. Thus the company has lost its
price value base as compared to its major competitors, the fast food
burger chains.
%m 1986 to 1987, Long John Silver's cod costs jumped 35 percent, to $2.30 per pound. The increase forced menu prices up about 9
percent over the past two fiscal years and resulted in a customer backia~h.~~*
Recently, Jerrico announced its 1989 strategy, which includes
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"testinga fast-food Italian concept and using,in addition to cod, a new
species of whitefish to enhance its perceived value and rebuild customer counts."63

Taco Viva
Taco Viva, another companythat experienced success initially, but
soon fell into the overexpansion trap, was considered a regional
(Florida) type of company filling a specific niche, Mexican fast food.
Until the company went public in 1982, growth was held at a gradual
pace. However, once the company went public, expansionbecame more
rapid. "Going public gave 'PamViva momentum to mow from the local
track to the fast track and J. Brian Fbulke I11 ('hco Viva's founder)
missed some warning signs of the train moving ~ Q Ofast."s0 The company's expansion was accelemted by leasing space in shopping malls
in 10 states. "By the end of 1985Taco Viva had 74 restaurants."66
The expansion strategy implemented by Taco Viva was launched
at a time of industry-wide problems, especially the saturation of the
Mexican restaurant segment. This, coupled with declining management control of existing stores, resulted in Taco Viva's loss of $1.7 million in 1986.
Also, the start up expenses associated with establishing units out
of the area, combined with a fall off in unit sales within the state, contributed to Taco Viva's distress. Additionally, insuEcient management
combined with this too rapid growth also led to the company's financial
difficulties.
Some analysts felt that Taco Viva should have expanded more
slowly outside of Florida rather than opening units in four or five states
in one year. An aborted buyout offer by W.R. Grace and Co. in 1985
weakened Taco Viva further, resulting in many managers abandoning
the company.
Recently, the sale of Taco Viva to Vista Group of London was announced "in order to get cash infusion to remodel the interiors of restaurants that were built in the late 1970'sand early 1980s.ns6
9

Ponderosa
Ponderosa, also very successful during its early years in operation,
was one of the earliest budget steak houses. The quality and atmosphere were somewhat less than traditional steak houses such as Steak
and Ale. The atmosphere was very spartan and similar to eating at
camp, long tables and family style seating. However, the consumer perceived the food was adequate for the price. Unfortunately, inflation
caused a rise in beef prices which in turn forced the company to raise
its menu prices. Customers began to object to paying $6 for a chewy
steak versus the former $3 price. They also began to object to the atmosphere. One upmanship by the company's competition also contributed
to its problems. Other similar concepts were able to offer more for the
same price. The company's chairman of the board also may have contri-

FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 7, Number 1, 1989
Copyright: Contents © 1989 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction
of any art work, editorial, or other material is expressly prohibited without
written permission from the publisher.

buted to its problems. Rather than trying to imprave the concept, he
continually replaced his operating personnel who were often experienced food service managers while he himself was not. Ponderosa is
no longer publicly held, having been taken private in a leveraged buyout.

D'Lites of America
D'Lites had a unique concept-healthy fast food. Menu items were
lower in calories than traditional fast fwd. Initially Wall Street loved
them. Both the profit margins and differentiation from the Big Three
chains (McDonald's, Burger King, and Wndy's) were there. They
began selling franchises at a very fast pace; however, they ran into problems of execution. Customers wanted the hamburgers to be readily available rather than having to wait for them. Additionally, the BigThree
were able to quickly expand into this niche with their salads, salad
bars, plain baked potatoes, etc.
Nonetheless, the company continued the expansion of D'Lites
"healthful fast food concept before it had been fully developed, i.e., who
D'Lites was, what it was and how to market
One of D'Lites major pitfalls was its policy of buying back unsuccessful franchises, which put a severe drain on cash flows. As cash flows
declined, D'Lites, which was heavily leveraged, found itself unable to
meet its debt load. Accordingly, D'Lites of America became another
classic example of a company that began with a most successful concept, but at the end of an eight-year period filed for bankruptcy due to
its poor execution. It seems customers wanted tasty food and rapid service and did not count calories.

Pizza TimeIShow-Biz Pizza
Pizza Time and Show-Biz Pizza were two companies that experienced financial difficulties primarily as a result of poor execution.They
constantly battled over the originality of the concept, opening units
next to each other in some markets. These companies experienced
rapid initial individual success with their franchises. However, these
individual successes evolved into vendettas of one operator against
another. Additionally, the pizza was of poor quality and taste, as was
the service. Another contributing factor to the financial problems was
the expense associated with the video game machines which were a
key part of the restaurants' concept. Some restaurants had a prohibition against teens being in the facility without their parents. Additionally, the home video game market grew rapidly and prices decreased
accordingly. Thus it was no longer necessary to go to one of these restaurants to play video games; sales continued to decline.

Ryan's Family Steakhouses
Ryan's,with headquarters in ~reenville,South Carolina, has been
credited with being among those pioneering the giant food bars that
have revitalized the family steakhouse segment.
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After becoming a publicly-held company in 1982, ?Ryan's became
an immediate hit on Wall Street, as its dedicated following kept sales
climbing. The 1985 introduction of the Megabar broadened the concept's appeal and kept sales rolling."68Wall Street's pressm on Ryan's
resulted in the astonishinggrowth rates of 100percent in 1986and 50
percent in 1987. But, as a result of steakhouse rivals upgrading their
salad bar selections and an overall core customer fatigue, "recent sofkness in sales suggests that Ryan's has not been able to sustain its appeal."69Accordingly, Ryan's has cut back expansion plans for the next

two years.

Vicorp Corp
Vicorp, the highly successful operator of Viage Inn Pancake
Houses, undertook a very aggressive expansion program beginning in
1984. It included the acquisition of 59 Poppin Fresh Pie houses h m
Pillsbury, over 200 restaurants from bankrupt Sambo's, and all 72 restaurants in Ralston l'urina's Continental R e s t a m t Systems. ''These
acquisitions transformed little Vicorp,' makmg the Company a very
risky proposition since Gordon Miles (Vicorp's chairman) had
mortgaged the company to the hilt."B0The continued conversion of
former Sambo's restaurants led to a $1.04million net loss in the first
quarter of 1986; the company earned $2.2 million in the first quarter
of 1985. "The company said its loss stemmed from initial operating
shorthlls in converted Sambo's and from the continuing expenses of
the conversion ~mgram."~l
Operating losses were cut to $162,000 in the first quarter of 1988.
With the drawn-out, taxing conversion of its Sambo's near completion
and some new top managementw in place,Vicorp has been fighting to
turn around its disappointing financial and operating performance of
the last few years. In this regard, Vicorp sold the profitable specialty
dinner house division for $17.5 million in late 1987 and is stepping up
marketing efforts to heighten its limited awareness in certain regions.
Vicorp will increase emphasison planning, selection, and development
of human resources.63
Some Lodging Firms Experience Financial Failure
While the companies reviewed in this article so far have been restaurants, there are a couple of hotel companies that should be mentioned as well.

Howard Johnson's Corp.
Howard Johnson's Corp., which by the end ofWrld War I1 had the
single best known name in the restaurant business in the United
States, had the same reputation McDonald's has today, but was unable
to hold that edge. This company's failure is attributed to the ego of Howard Johnson, Jr. He rehsed to pay attention to new trends, particularly
the growth of the fast food industry.He didn't permit money to be spent
for renovation and also refused to put cash back into the business.
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In December 1979 Imperial Group PLC, a leading British conglomerate, paid $630 million to acquire Howard Johnson's Corp. However, Imperial failed to accomplish its goal of straightening out Howard
Johnson's and reversing a deteriorating trend that kept the company
stagnant and unable to reach its full potential. In November 1985, Imperial sold Howard Johnson's chain, except for the Ground Round Division, to Marriott for $300 million, including the assumption of $138
million in debt. At the same time, Marriott sold the lodging properties
and the franchise system to Prime Motor Inns.

La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc.
La Quinta Motor Inns is another example of a hotel company in
financial distress. Strategically and successfully positioned between
budget and luxury hotels, La Quinta increased its number of rooms by
over 100 percent between 1975 and 1980, while achieving occupancies
of 80 percent and 90 percent, well above industry averages. Return of
Equity was over 20 percent.
But La Quinta was greatly affected by the 1982-1983 recession,
"the most d i f ~ c u ltime
t
in its corporate h i s t o e since the economic
downturn spread to its major market area, the Southwest, as opposed
to previous recessions.
However, the company has strong management and was able to
quickly recognize what was happening to the economy in its market
areas. La Quinta was over-committed to the oil belt, Texas, Oklahoma,
and Louisiana. The economies in these states are or were very dependent on energy revenues. The company placed too many units in too
small a geographic area so there was too rapid growth without geographic diversification.
Nonetheless, it is believed this company will be able to turn itself
around and continue to grow,but a t a much slower pace. La Quinta
has adopted several financial strategies such as significantly cutting
expenses while focusing development efforts on "expansion into a variety of geographic areas with diverse economies to eliminate the risks
associated with dependence on any economic area."65
Lessons Can Be Learned
As can be seen from our discussion of what contributed to the failure, whether partial or total, of the hospitality companies presented
here, there are a number of factors involved. W need to take note or
become aware of these factors in order to avoid making the same mistakes in the future. To summarize the factors contributing to financial
failures, the following is a list of reasons for hospitality company failW S .

There is a common theme or thread that runs throughout all the
companies presented here, a lack of execution of company management which was manifested through lack of responsiveness to change,
inadequate manager andlor employee training, or failure to execute
the company's concept properly; all of these companies experienced
this problem to some degree.
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Ego of the founder or chairman is another factor. Both Ponderosa
Steak House and Howard Johnson's Corp. experienced this problem.

The ego of the founder or CEO prevented these companies from adapting to changes in their markets.
Undercapitalization and, closely related to it, overexpansion, are
additional reasons that contribute to a company's financial distress.
Undemapitalization primarily effects individual hospitality operations; Benihana's and its Big Splash concept is a good example of this
factox If p u spend too much on an individual unit, as they did, you
can never hope to make a return on the investment. Any time a company builds a new type unit or introduces a new concept, it must try
to ensure that any capitalexpenses involved can be retrieved and some
sort of return on investment obtained.
Large companies have also experienced this problem as a result
of expanding too quickly before the concept is solidified. Examples include DZites, Victoria Station, and Taco Viva.
Another contributing factor to a company's financial failure is
non-diversification in the marketplace. The best example of this situation has been La Quinta Motor Inns. Because operations were concentrated in such a small geographic area, the Southwestern United
States, when the economies were "bust" in these areas, so did La
Quinta's financial situation. Because they were so concentrated in the
oil belt states and heavily dependent on oil revenues, when oil prices
dropped, so did La Quinta's occupancies.
Abandonment of a successful concept is an additional factor contributing to financial failures. Nndy's is the prime example of a company experiencing problems as a result of this factox In its attempt to
attract a larger or broader share of the market, Wkndy's moved away
h m a concept based strictly on burgers by expanding the menu to include baked potatoes, salads, chicken, and breakfast items, none of
which helped to broaden its appeal with consumers, but did result in
increased operating expenses.
Seekinggrowthand assuming profits will follow is another reason
some hospitality companies end up with hancial problems. Taco Viva
is an example of what can happen in this situation. Just because an
idea works in one community doesn't mean it will work everywhere.
Taco Viva continued to expand its operation despite the fad sales in
existingunits had begun to dmp off. Potential investors in the hospitality industry should be skeptical of a company's financial projections.
There is no such thing as a negative financial projection. Cash flows
are always positive because that is what the potential investor wants
to see. Financial projections often are simply the hopes and dreams of
a management based upon limited experience and results. The company's past performance or history is what the investor needs to look at.
A lack of inadequate internal controls can also contributeto a comp a e s failure. This factor is actually an example of poor management
execution. Sambo's is one of the best examples of this situation. ARer
the company's Fraction of the Action program was discontinued and
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managers leR in droves, internal controls within the individual units
began to dissolve. Cleanliness and sanitation problems became swicant, as did improper cash handling. To make matters worse, there
was no training program in existence to assist the replacement managers in developing or maintaining good internal controls.
Some companies have experienced financial problems as a result
of poor upkeep. In other words, the company refuses to allocate funds
for renovation or general upgrade of the facilities or property. Howard
Johnson's is one example. Howard Johnson, Jr. refused to put capital
back into the business; thus, facilities began to deteriorate, giving consumers the impression they were no longer the quality operation they
once were.
A company's success may also decline as a result of reliance on a
gimmick or a theme that goes stale. Victoria Station is the best example of a company whose failure can be blamed primarily on a successful
theme going stale. Serving prime rib in old railroad boxcars was initially successful, but people tired of eating in them and tastes shifted
away from beef to chicken, fish, and other "lighter" alternatives. Unfort ~ n a t e l y ~ c t o rStation
ia
was unable to adapt to these changes.
Table 3 summarizes the lessons to be learned by the hospitality
industry pursuant to the problems experienced by these companies.

Table 3
Lessons To Be Learned
Company

Major ProblemAreas

LessonsTo Be Learned

Rndy's

Deviation from proved
concept
Breakfast concept
Overexpansion
Discountdcoupons

When a concept works and is
accepted by consumers
the company should expand on it
rather than move away from it.
New concepts should be
thoroughly tested prior to
store-wideimplementation.
Again, gmwth/expansion must be
controlled. Discounts should be
used sparingly.

Victoria Station

Stale theme
Overexpansion
Change in consumer
tastes
Confusion over new
concept
Expansion intohighly
competitivemarket

Must be careful that the concept
is flexible and can be adapted
to change in the market. Growth/
expansion must be controlled. New
conceptsor changes to existing
concept should be thoroughly
tested prior to implementation.
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Company

Major Problem Areas LessonsTo Belearned
Top managementmust ensure a
High management
turnover.Pbor
management trainingprogram
management execution exiata and is valid. Management
Overexpansion
must concentrate on existing
operationa in addition to the
new. Growth/expansionmust be
controlled.

Jemco, Inc.

Rise in food costs

(importedoodfish)

Don't rely on limited sourcesof
supply.

TacoViva

Overexpansion
Market saturation of
the concept
h r management
execution

GrowtMexpansionmust be
controlled,particularlyin new
market areas.Must be able to
h da way to position
themselvesfrom competition.
Managementmust focus
attention on existing unita as
well as on new unita.

Ponderosa

Rise in food costs
Competition
Ego of the CEO

Price inwases should be
accompanied with an increased
pemption of value which in
&n makes you more competitive.
Top managementmust be sensitive
to economicchanges.

D'Lites ofAmerica

Concept not M y
developed
Buyback of
&uccessll
franchises.Poor
management
execution

Concept must be fully tested
prior to full scale expansion.
Growthmust be controlledwith
management oversight.
Manamment must focus on
pmpe~internalcontrol
procedures.

Pizza Time/
Show Biz Pizza

Pbor management
Management must focus on proper
execution
internal control procedures,
Management infighting such as product quality,
Lack of customer
customer satisfaction,wants/
service
desires of target market. Top
Gimmick theme
management must instill a sense
of teamwork throughout the
company.

Ryan'sFamily
Steakhouses

WaJl Street pressure
to maintain sales
growth

G
d in uniWsales must be
reasonable and consistently
achievable.Constant analysisof
competition.Be able to adapt
to changes in market.

Vicorp Corporation 'Ikm ambitious
Solvencyis extremely important.
an expansionprogram Gmwth and acquisitionsmust be
well managed t6ensure the
company staysfinancially
healthy.
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Company

Major Problem Areas

LessonsTo Be Learned

HowardJohnson's

Ego of founder
Failure to invest in
a growingbusiness

Companies must continue to
invest in their existing
operationsto capitalizeon
an outstandingoperation.

Non-diversification
Poor economic
environment

Companies should not concentrate
on one geographic area, but
should pursue growth in diverse
economic areas.

Corporation

La QuintaMotor
Inns, Inc

It is hoped the hospitality industry can learn and is learning from the
examples of failure cited here. In order to become or remain successful,
hospitality companies need to refocus their efforts away from uncontrolled operation and its associated problems. It is equally important
to be aware of the fadors leading to the failure process in order to recognize the warning signals.
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